This paper focuses on issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We analyze the benefits of informational control-restricting the precision of the expert's information (without learning its content). In this case, the result of Dessein (2002) [8] that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is better than communication when preferences between the expert and the principal are not too far apart is reversed. We demonstrate that these organizational forms-informational control and delegation-can be either complements or substitutes, depending on the principal's ability to affect the expert's discretion about the set of allowed policies.
Introduction
Situations in which principals do not have enough information and need to consult experts before implementing a policy can be found everywhere. Investors consult investment bankers about the value of securities, headquarters consult managers before making corporate decisions, and politicians consult advisors on special subjects. However, the benefits of communication are often impaired by a conflict of interest. If the parties' interests differ, the expert may want to misrepresent information in an attempt to manipulate a principal's decision.
A potentially effective solution to this communication problem is to delegate authority to the expert herself and get the benefits of her informational advantage. Then, even though the expert's decision is biased, the trade-off between the loss of authority in delegation and the loss of information in communication often favors the former (Dessein [8] ). However, many companies still centralize authority at upper levels of the hierarchy. 1 This paper provides an argument in favor of centralization when it is accompanied by another instrument-controlling the quality of the expert's private information without learning its content (hereafter, informational control).
In general, informational control represents a "cheap talk" situation in which the expert conducts an experiment and reports its results to the principal, whereas the principal determines the precision of the measurement device and makes a decision, but has no ability to commit to actions. Applications of informational control are the regulations on the procedures of acquiring information by the expert (e.g., testing procedures or experiment techniques) with limited or costly possibilities of monitoring the expert's information by the principal. High opportunity or direct costs of obtaining information-the necessity of managing multiple tests, lower expertise in conducting experiments, or other responsibilities of the principal-enforce the principal to involve the biased expert in the process of acquiring information. 2 Since information is now observed only by the expert, it might not be easily verified by the principal, so that it becomes a subject of further communication. Consider, for example, the communication problem in defense procurement. Whereas the military (expert) has the expertise to evaluate and determine the weapons characteristics, the budget for production is determined by the Congress (principal). The issue is that the interests of the parties may be different-it is argued that the military can be biased toward weapons with excessive costs (Rogerson [31] ). Moreover, the Department of Defense has received multiple accusations about manipulating tests results to yield the most favorable interpretation possible. 3 This work offers a potential solution to this communication problem. In terms of our model, informational control can be implemented by imposing the restrictions on the testing procedures performed by the military. We show that the form of restrictions that improve communication is simple and requires the tests to round information to the particular unit of measurement or assign it to an element of a category. In the simplest case, the test has to return a "yes/no" answer depending on whether a measured variable, e.g., the maximum operating temperature, is above or below some cut-off level. Medicine is another potential application of informational control. 4 Loss of information in communication implies that the expert possesses too much information relative to the amount that she is ready to reveal to the principal. Proper restrictions on the expert's information can increase her incentives to reveal it truthfully. In particular, if the set of experiment outcomes consists of a finite number of values, claiming that the observed information is between some values makes the expert's message not credible. In contrast, reporting another possible value may result in an unfavorable decision. As a result, though the expert knows less, she is willing to convey her information truthfully. That is, the principal faces a trade-off between 1 The Economist, Aug. 5th 2004. 2 As Austen-Smith [2] notes: "when the information has to be acquired, it is natural to suppose the acquisition is costly; for otherwise, there is no reason why such information is asymmetrically distributed." 3 See, for example, the U.S. General Accounting Office [11] [12] [13] . 4 Consider communication between patients (principals) and doctors (experts). Doctors give advice on treatments of health problems on the basis of medical tests. This advice can be biased due to the conflict of interest, since doctors are concerned not only about matching a treatment to patients' conditions, but also about treatment's costs. Medical literature contains many examples of unnecessary and costly treatments, which were recommended by doctors (Consumer Reports on Health [6] ; Liu and Byrne [27] ). Our findings suggest that the communication problem between doctors and patients might be mitigated if the Food and Drug Administration imposes proper restrictions on the techniques of tests, which are used for determining conditions of patients.
the precision of the expert's primary information and her incentives to reveal it. 5 As shown by Fischer and Stocken [9] for some special cases, restricting the amount of expert's information can be better for the principal. It is natural to ask whether restricting the expert's information performs better than a more effective organizational form-full or partial delegation-and how the two variations of the communication game interact with each other. This paper addresses these issues. The key question of this work is the efficiency ranking of two incentive instruments: informational control and delegation. Our major contributions are as follows. First, we consider the problem of finding the optimal equilibrium (from the ex-ante principal's viewpoint). In order to reduce the complexity of this problem, we derive the model-specific form of the revelation principle, which establishes that any ex-ante equilibrium payoff is weakly below the payoff in a truthtelling equilibrium. Second, we demonstrate that controlling the expert's information before communication is beneficial for the principal compared to: (1) communication with the perfectly informed expert as long as informative communication is sustainable; and (2) optimal delegation as long as the bias in the players' preferences is not very large. For the popular uniform-quadratic specification, informational control is payoff superior to optimal delegation if and only if informative communication is feasible. Finally, we show that if the principal restricts the expert's information and delegates decision making afterwards, then the efficiency of the combined mechanism is determined by the principal's ability to restrict the set of delegated decisions. In the case of full delegation, the combined mechanism cannot improve the more efficient separate instrument. In contrast, if the principal is able to specify both the expert's information structure and the delegation set, the combined mechanism results in the strictly higher principal's payoff.
These findings address the question examined by Dessein [8] , who compares the performance of full delegation versus communication with the perfectly informed expert. Dessein establishes that "the principal prefers to delegate control to a better informed agent rather than to communicate with this agent as long as the incentive conflict is not too large relative to the principal's uncertainty about the environment." Our work shows that this result is reversed if the principal can limit the precision of the expert's information. That is, as the divergence in preferences decreases, the principal prefers controlling the expert's information and keeping authority to delegating decision making to the perfectly informed expert.
The argument in favor of communication becomes stronger if one notes that full delegation is a special case of the optimal delegation. In the latter case, the principal restricts the set of policies, which can be chosen by the expert to prevent her from implementing, for example, extreme actions. Papers by Goltsman et al. [16] and Kovàc and Mylovanov [21] show that optimal delegation is the most efficient solution in a bigger class of arbitration mechanisms in which the players interact through an arbiter, who collects information from the expert and gives enforceable recommendations to the principal. In contrast, informational control allows the principal to gain from the expert's information without transferring control over decisions to the expert or a third party. Fig. 1 compares the performance of three organizational forms for different qualities of an expert's information (arrows represent the payoff dominance). 6 As this figure shows, there is only one situation in which the principal prefers not to limit the expert's information. This is 5 This trade-off is the main driving force behind the results on the optimality of coarse information structures in the related literature. See, for example, Bergemann and Pesendorfer [3] and Saak [32] on the mechanism design problems with endogenous information structures. 6 That is, moving along the arrows increases the principal's ex-ante payoff. the case of full delegation. However, in this scenario, the principal can gain from restricting the expert's information and communicating with her afterwards.
Holmström [18] , Melumad and Shibano [28] , and Alonso and Matouschek [1] investigate the optimal restrictions on the set of delegated policies which maximize the principal's ex-ante payoff. 8 Goltsman et al. [16] and Kovàc and Mylovanov [21] extend this setup by allowing the principal to commit to mixtures over actions as functions of the expert's reports. These studies consider the expert's information structure as exogenous, whereas our work investigates the relationship between the endogenous quality of expert's information and delegation. Bester and Strausz [4] and Krishna and Morgan [22] analyze a different incentive instrumentmonetary transfers from the principal to the expert as the functions of messages. Bester and Strausz [4] establish the revelation principle for the finite type environment, in which the principal can commit only to some dimensions of the decision space. They show that any payoff on the Pareto frontier can be replicated in a direct mechanism. Krishna and Morgan [22] extend this result to the infinite type space and characterize the optimal contracts under perfect and partial commitment. Similar to these studies, we establish a limited form of the revelation principle which shows that the optimal payoff can be reached in a truthtelling equilibrium.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights motivating examples. Section 3 presents the formal model. Section 4 establishes the modified revelation principle. Section 5 compares the efficiency of informational control versus optimal delegation. For the uniform-quadratic settings, these results are sharpened in Section 6. Section 7 considers a combination of informational control and delegation. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Examples
We start with the uniform-quadratic variant of the model introduced by Crawford and Sobel [7] . Two players, the uninformed principal (or the receiver) and the better informed expert (or the sender), communicate on the state of nature, which is represented by a random variable θ uniformly distributed on Θ = [0, 1]. We will refer to the expert as "she" and the principal as "he". The expert sends a costless message m to the principal, who then implements an action a. The players' utility functions are quadratic:
where parameter b > 0 reflects the bias in the players' interests. Suppose first that the expert observes θ . Crawford and Sobel [7] demonstrate that all of the equilibria have a form of finite monotone partitions. That is, there are at most N CS b intervals on Θ so that the expert's message reveals only the interval that contains θ , which results in a corresponding principal's decision. 
Example 1.
Let the bias be b = 1/5. In the most informative CS equilibrium, the expert sends a "low" message if θ 1/10, and a "high" message otherwise. Because the high message is more expected, it updates the principal's prior information insignificantly. A low message is more informative as it is sent only if the expert's type is very low. However, the probability of sending it is 1/10. Since communication is effective for low states only, the principal's ex-ante payoff U CS R −1/16 is just above his payoff −1/12 in the case of no communication. 8 See also a recent survey by Mookherjee [29] , who discusses the costs and benefits of various organizational forms and points out conditions that affect their relative performance.
If the expert sent a higher message only in the case of θ > 1/2, the principal's ex-ante payoff would increase. This is because the benefits of more informative communication for high states would exceed the losses in the quality of communication for low states. The problem is that this strategy is not sustainable in an equilibrium, because if the positively biased expert knew that θ = 1/2 or slightly below it, she would strictly benefit from sending a high message. However, if the expert knows only that θ is above or below 1/2, then there is an equilibrium, in which she reveals her information truthfully. This results in the principal's ex-ante payoff of −1/48. 9 Intuitively, it is easier to align information of the imperfectly informed expert with the decisions that are more efficient for the principal. The perfectly informed expert has more possibilities to distort her information by claiming a different state of nature since the state space is infinite. These possibilities, however, are limited if the expert's information structure generates only a few points. (In the example above, these are posterior values of the state for each interval, which are equal to the interval mean values.) This makes slight distortion of information impossible. Since the principal knows the set of expert's valuations, he would not believe that the expert's information is somewhere between these points. In contrast, substantial exaggerating by reporting another possible value induces an action that is far from the expert's first best decision. This does not leave the expert any choice but to communicate truthfully. Thus, if the informational losses of the expert's primary information are lower than those in communication with a perfectly informed expert, the overall effect of informational control is positive. 10 Moreover, the benefits of controlling the expert's information are powerful enough to provide a higher ex-ante payoff to the principal compared to delegation as shown below. 
The model
We extend the standard setup of the CS model by introducing a preliminary stage, in which the principal specifies the expert's information structure at zero cost. An information structure is 9 Moreover, there is an equilibrium with three expert's signals-for a state less than 1/5, between 1/5 and 4/5, and above 4/5-which provides the expected payoff U R −1/52. Partitions with a bigger number of intervals violate the expert's incentives to communicate truthfully, which results in the distortion of information and lowers the principal's ex-ante payoff. 10 The partitional structure of CS equilibria is determined by the boundary types, who are indifferent between two consequent actions (in the above example, it is type θ 1 = 1 10 ). Because of the expert's positive bias, the higher action is further from the boundary type. This creates inefficiency, since types just above the boundary type induce a higher action, which is less beneficial to the principal. However, if the expert can observe only the intervals, the boundary types are replaced by the mean values of lower intervals. These values are closer to the principal's actions, so that upon observing an interval, the expert strictly prefers the associated action. Thus, extending the lower interval via changing the information structure does not affect the expert's preferences over actions. At the same time, it benefits the principal because of associating states above the boundary type with a more preferable (lower) action.
defined by a triplet S, M, F (s|θ) , where S and M are measurable spaces of expert's signals and messages, respectively, and F (s|θ) is a conditional distribution of a signal s for a given state θ . The state is a draw from a twice differentiable distribution F (θ) with a positive density
After privately observing a signal s generated by the information structure, the expert estimates the posterior valuation of the state,
where F (θ|s) is a conditional distribution of θ given a signal s. Thus, every information structure generates a distribution of posterior values
where F (s) is a marginal distribution of the joint distribution F (s, θ) = F (θ)F (s|θ). We say that the information structure is discrete if G(ω) is supported on a finite set Ω.
Throughout this paper, we focus on the class of the quadratic utility functions (1) as the standard preferences used in the related literature. 11 That is, the principal's payoff function U R (a, θ ) has a unique maximum for the action a = θ and the expert's payoff function U S (a, b, θ) has a maximum for a = θ + b.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal specifies the expert's information structure, which is then observed by the expert. Next, a realization of the state occurs, and the expert privately observes a signal. Then, the expert transmits a costless message to the principal, who makes a decision.
Equilibrium
Given an information structure S, M, F (s|θ) , a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (hereafter, equilibrium) consists of a signaling strategy σ : S → M, which specifies a probability distribution σ (m|s) over the space of messages for each signal; the principal's action rule a : M → R; and a belief function F : M → Θ, which specifies a probability distribution over Θ for each message m, including messages that are not sent in the equilibrium. 12 The belief function is constructed on the basis of Bayes' rule where applicable. 13 11 See, for example, Blume et al. [5] , Goltsman et al. [16] , Krishna and Morgan [22] [23] [24] [25] , Melumad and Shibano [28] , Ottaviani and Squintani [30] . 12 Though the information structure is an endogenous component of the game, without loss of generality we can consider the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a subgame with a given information structure. This is because an arbitrary information structure can be sustained in an equilibrium. In order to see it, note that given any information structure, the subgame contains the uninformative equilibrium, in which the expert sends a pure noise, and the principal ignores the expert's messages. Hence, it is an equilibrium strategy for the expert to send an informative message if the principal chooses a particular information structure, and a pure noise otherwise. Under this threat, the principal's equilibrium strategy is to specify this particular information structure and react to the expert's messages optimally. 13 For all messages m / ∈ M, we define the receiver's beliefs in such a way that he interprets them as some m 0 ∈ M.
The action rule a(m) maximizes the principal's utility given F (θ |m), 14
For quadratic preferences,
Given a(m), the signaling strategy maximizes the expert's utility
That is, σ (m|s) must satisfy ifm ∈ supp σ (.|s), thenm ∈ arg max m∈M U S a(m), b|s , and
Let M(ā) = {m: a(m) =ā}. We say that an actionā is induced by a signal s if
Given a signal s, the expert's utility function can be decomposed as
where
is the conditional residual variance of θ , which represents the expert's informational losses. Similarly, U R (a|s) can be written as
Thus, for each signal s, the players' preferences over actions are purely determined by the posterior values ω s , which we interpret as expert's types.
Truthtelling equilibria
This section addresses the problem of finding the optimal equilibria, which maximize the exante principal's payoff. This problem, however, is complicated due to two reasons. First, the set of all equilibria is substantially large. For example, a single information structure can sustain a continuum of equilibria with different payoffs. Second, the lack of the principal's commitment to actions results in the failure of the standard revelation principle. This principle restricts the set of all equilibrium outcomes to those of truthtelling equilibria, in which each expert's type fully identifies herself by sending a type-specific message.
We simplify this problem by establishing the modified version of the revelation principle, which allows us to focus on truthtelling equilibria only. As a result, the principal can restrict attention to the incentive-compatible information structures, i.e., the structures that sustain truthtelling equilibria.
Revelation principle
We prove the revelation principle in two steps. First, we show that the number of induced actions in any equilibrium is finite, and no information structure can sustain an equilibrium in which the number of actions exceeds that of expert's types. Hence, any incentive-compatible information structure must be discrete. Second, we formulate the revelation principle itself by demonstrating that any equilibrium is weakly payoff inferior, i.e., provides a lower ex-ante payoff to the principal, to some truthtelling equilibrium with a possibly modified information structure. All proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium (1) the set of induced actions A is finite, and the distance between any two actions is no less than 2b; and (2) the number of actions does not exceed the number of types.
By contradiction, if two actions are very close to each other, then among the expert's types, which induce a lower action, types above some cut-off level can profitably deviate by inducing a higher action. 15 The first implication of this lemma is that the finiteness of the number of actions comes from the expert's bias rather than from the cardinality of the type space. Thus, generating a large number of posterior valuations does not eventually benefit the principal, since the expert's signaling strategy is no longer invertible. This leads to losses in conveyed information and the principal's payoff.
The second part of the lemma states that any equilibrium outcome can be replicated with the information structure, in which the number of messages is finite and does not exceed the number of types. By contradiction, if it is not true, then there must be a type ω that (1) induces two actions, say, a and a > a; and (2) a is induced by type ω only. Because of the principal's best response (2) , it follows that a = ω. That is, a < a < a S (ω), where a S (ω) = ω + b is the expert's optimal action. This means that the payoff to type ω from inducing a is strictly lower than that from inducing a . Thus, type ω cannot induce both actions.
We use Lemma 1 to show that an arbitrary equilibrium is weakly payoff inferior to some truthtelling one and to identify two classes of equilibria that are never optimal.
Lemma 2. Any equilibrium is weakly payoff inferior to some truthtelling equilibrium (with a possibly different information structure).

Corollary 1. If in an equilibrium, either (1) a positive mass of types induces two actions; or (2)
there exists an interval of types W with a positive and bounded density and a type ω s ∈ int W , 15 If a and a > a are two induced actions, then there exists state θ , which makes the expert indifferent between a and
. In addition, all types above θ strictly prefer a . By (2) , it follows that a θ , which gives a − a a + a − 2θ = 2b.
such that the types in W below and above ω s induce distinct actions, then such an equilibrium is strictly payoff inferior to some truthtelling equilibrium.
The superior truthtelling equilibrium in Lemma 2 is constructed in two steps. In the first step, we derive all types that play mixed strategies and assign one to the probabilities of inducing the lower actions. Since a lower action is closer to the principal's optimal policy for each expert's type, the new expert's strategy provides the higher payoff to the principal. However, the argument is incomplete because the expert's incentive-compatibility constraints change as the principal adjusts the actions to the new signaling strategy. To resolve this issue, the second step is to modify the information structure by collapsing all types that induce identical actions. This decreases the expert's incentives to manipulate information, since each new expert's type is closer to the associated action compared to the highest type that (weakly) preferred this action in the original equilibrium. Thus, no type can profitably deviate by inducing another action. 16 The corollary applies this logic to two types of equilibria, which inherit the main source of the inefficiency of CS communication. In these equilibria, there exists a positive mass of types, which can induce more efficient actions via changing the information structure. In the first case, these are the types that mix over decisions. In the second case, the interval contains an expert's type, which is indifferent between two actions. Thus, a positive mass of types above the indifferent type purely induces a higher action, which is more distant from the principal's optimal action than a lower one. Modifying the information structure in the same way as in Lemma 2 allows to link these types to the more efficient decisions without violating the incentive-compatibility constraints. 17 The main implication of the revelation principle is that the principal never wants to provide the expert with information that would not be revealed in communication. However, the cost of truthtelling is the expert's informational losses. Thus, the principal has to compromise between the losses of the expert's primary information and those in further communication. The next section estimates the efficiency of this trade-off.
The value of controlling information
How powerful a tool is informational control? In what scenarios does the principal benefit from restricting the expert's information? In this section, we compare the efficiency of infor- 16 For each new action a o i , the set of types W o i that induce this action is collapsed into the single type
, it is smaller than the highest type that (weakly) preferred action a i to a i+1 in the original equilibrium. Thus, type ω o i also prefers a i to a i+1 . Also, note that each "mixing" type, which induced two actions in the original equilibrium, was (1) the highest type that induced a smaller action a i ; and (2) the lowest type that induced a i+1 . Purely inducing a lower action by the mixing type increases both actions. Therefore, the new action a o i+1 becomes further from the optimal decision of type ω o i compared to a i+1 , whereas a o i becomes closer to the optimal decision compared to a i . That is, no type ω o i can beneficially deviate from inducing a o i . 17 There is some similarity between our revelation principle and that by Bester and Strausz [4] . Though it is impossible to sustain every equilibrium outcome, the optimal equilibria in both models can be replicated by using the number of messages smaller than or equal to that of types. In addition, the constructions of the (weakly) payoff superior equilibria involve modifying the expert's strategies. However, while the expert's strategy in Bester and Strausz [4] is changed in such a way that the principal's beliefs about the expert's types for the smaller set of messages are identical to those in the initial equilibrium, this does not guarantee truthtelling reporting. Our construction is based on changing the information structure via generating the limited number of expert's types, which are sufficiency distinct. In this case, reporting a different type by the expert induces an unfavorable action, so that truthtelling is feasible. mational control versus two main organizational forms with the perfectly informed expert: CS communication and optimal delegation.
Though the revelation principle allows us to restrict attention to the truthtelling equilibria, it does not tell much about the principal's payoffs in these equilibria. Since these equilibria are sustained by the incentive-compatible information structures, it is helpful to specify a class of such structures, which, while not necessarily optimal, provide a clear characterization of the principal's ex-ante payoffs and are simple enough to implement. These requirements are satisfied by the simplest form of discrete information structures: partitional, in which Θ is partitioned into a finite number N of intervals
, and the expert observes only an interval that contains θ . Equivalently, a partition can be described by a strictly increasing sequence {θ k } N k=0 of its boundary points, where θ 0 = 0 and θ N = 1, or a sequence of interval lengths
. The informational losses of type ω k are determined by the residual variance
Note that the principal cannot benefit from introducing noise in the expert's information in an arbitrary way. For example, the "truth-or-noise" information structure, in which the expert observes either θ or an indistinguishable uninformative draw from the same distribution, results in the inferior payoff compared to that in CS communication. 18 As demonstrated above, while considering the information structures in the optimal equilibria (hereafter, optimal information structures), we can restrict attention to those of a discrete form. However, even among discrete information structures, not all can be easily implemented. In general, the principal has to specify a continuum of mappings from Θ into the set of probability distributions over Ω. In contrast, the partitional structures are relatively simple as they require only attributing θ to a particular interval.
Informational control versus CS communication
First, we establish the dominance of informational control over CS communication. The only necessary condition for this result is the feasibility of informative CS communication.
Theorem 1. If there exists an informative CS equilibrium, then informational control is payoff superior to CS communication.
The result is an immediate consequence of Corollary 1. Intuitively, any informative CS partition is characterized by an unequal distribution of the informational losses across the state space. The expert's incentives to exaggerate information weaken the principal's trust to the messages about high states compared to those about low states. As a result, the quality of communication decreases monotonically in the value of the state of nature. This effect is reflected in unequal sizes of the partition elements in any CS equilibrium. Thus, the principal can take any CS partition as a basic one and locally modify it in such a way that the variance in the intervals' lengths becomes smaller. Partitioning states into intervals guarantees that truthtelling is incentive-compatible. Furthermore, a more effective distribution of the informational losses relative to that in the CS case results in a higher principal's payoff.
Informational control versus optimal delegation
Before comparing delegation and informational control, note that these incentive tools utilize different factors for payoff improvement. Delegation allows the principal to acquire benefits from the expert's informational advantage at a cost of losing control over decisions, whereas controlling the expert's information restricts the possibilities to manipulate it at a cost of a lower quality of primary information. Thus, at first glance, there seems to be no clear intuition about which factor is stronger. The following result demonstrates the ranking, if the players' interests are not too far apart.
Theorem 2. There exists a biasb such that for b b , informational control is payoff superior to optimal delegation.
The intuition behind this result can be explained in two steps. First, compare informational control with full delegation. In any truthtelling communication equilibrium, the set of actions coincides with the set of generated posterior values. By Lemma 1, the incentive-compatibility requires that the distance between any two actions, and, thus, posterior values, must be at least 2b. For small biases, the lengths of intervals in the uniform incentive-compatible partition with the largest number of intervals are also small. 19 This results in the lower variation of the density on each interval. Hence, the distribution of states can be piecewise approximated by the uniform distributions on intervals. Due to this effect, the posterior values must be close to the middle points of the associated intervals. Thus, the ratio of the length of each interval in the partition to the bias is close to 2 regardless of the distribution of states. A combination of these factors implies that the principal's expected losses in the truthtelling equilibrium with this partition tend to the variance of the uniform distribution on the interval of length 2b. These are equal to − 3 , which are lower than those of −b 2 in full delegation. Second, Kovàc and Mylovanov [21] show that when b falls, the optimal delegation set converges to the entire state space. As a result, the benefits of restricted delegation become negligible relative to that of full delegation, and the previous argument still holds.
The uniform-quadratic case
In this section, we focus on the particular uniform-quadratic setup of the model, which has been a central framework for a large part of the related economic and political science literature. This case with a uniform distribution of states and quadratic preferences is known for its flexi- 19 For example, for the uniform distribution,
and θ k = θ k − θ k−1 imply that the incentive-compatibility constraint ω k+1 − ω k 2b is equivalent to θ k+1 + θ k 4b. bility to modifications of the basic CS model and the possibility to obtain closed-form solutions in various applications. 20 Investigating the uniform-quadratic case allows us to sharpen the previous results. First, we obtain an explicit characterization of the optimal partition. Second, we employ the characterization of the optimal delegation set. Combining these components, we demonstrate that controlling the expert's information performs strictly better than optimal delegation if and only if informative communication is feasible.
Optimal partitional structure
In this subsection, we characterize the optimal information structure among partitions and show that it differs from the CS partitions in two aspects. First, the optimal partition allocates informational losses more efficiently, but not necessarily uniformly, across the state space. Second, the Pareto superior partition does not necessarily have the largest number of elements, among all incentive-compatible ones.
Since, by Lemma 2, we can restrict attention to truthtelling equilibria only, one can observe that the expert's incentives have a simple form. In particular, an expert of any type ω k prefers to induce an action a k instead of a k+1 if and only if
and never induces an action a < a k , since the principal's best response implies a < a k = ω k < ω k + b, and the strict concavity of the utility function results in
The family of inequalities (7) determines the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints. These conditions are an analogue of the CS no-arbitrage conditions θ k+1 = 2θ k − θ k−1 + 4b, which can be rewritten as θ k+1 = θ k + 4b, k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Comparing these conditions to (7), one can make two observations. First, constraints (7) are more relaxed, which means that the principal can specify a finer information structure in the informational control model than in the CS setup. Second, the CS no-arbitrage condition implies that the length of any interval in the CS partition must exceed that of the previous interval by 4b. In contrast, (7) excludes this inefficiency for high values of the state.
To find the optimal incentive-compatible partition, we first determine the maximal size of the incentive-compatible partition N(b). It can be shown that The stark difference of the optimal information partition from the endogenous CS partitions is that the principal does not always prefer the partition with the highest number of elements. The reason is that the optimal partition highlights a trade-off between two different structures. The first one is uniform, so that it efficiently distributes the informational losses of the risk averse principal across the state space. The second one allows the principal to better react to the expert's messages due to a higher number of actions. The cut-off biases b N(b) are the ones, for which these information structures are payoff equivalent. Notice that the non-uniform partitions are never optimal in the model of Fischer and Stocken [9] due to the special values of the bias.
Informational control versus optimal delegation
In the uniform-quadratic specification, the optimal delegation set consists of a single interval [0, 1 − min{b, 1/2}] (Holmström [18] ). Moreover, it is an optimal solution for a bigger class of arbitration mechanisms, in which the players interact via a disinterested arbiter, who collects information from the expert and gives enforceable recommendations to the principal (Goltsman et al. [16] ; Kovàc and Mylovanov [21] ). Then, combining the solutions for optimal delegation and the partitional structure allows us to outline all scenarios, in which informational control is more attractive than delegation. The necessary and sufficient condition for this is the feasibility of informative communication.
Theorem 3. In the class of all information structures, informational control is payoff superior to optimal delegation if and only if informative communication is feasible.
The intuition behind this result relies on the same background as used in Theorem 2. However, using the solutions to the optimal delegation set and information partition, it is straightforward to show that the cut-off biasb = 1/4 is the one, which sustains informative communication. In contrast, if the b > 1/4, then there is no information structure with informative communication. Moreover, expanding the class of information structures has no effect on the outcome of communication. For extremely high values of the bias, the most informative communication involves just two types. Among all information structures that generate two types, the partitional one has an important feature: it maximizes the distance between the posterior values and, hence, actions. As a result, shifting a higher action further from the optimal point of the low-type expert increases the punishment for distorting her type. That is, communication is informative if and only if it is informative with the partitional information structure.
Delegation to an imperfectly informed expert
The above discussion raises two natural questions. First, are there benefits from using the advantages of information control and delegation in a combined mechanism? Second, how does the efficiency of this instrument depend on the principal's ability to restrict the set of delegated actions? We address these questions below. 
Full delegation
The example above illustrates that in the case of full delegation, the perfectly informed expert performs better than the imperfectly informed one. This is true in general. If there are no restrictions on the delegation set, then controlling the expert's information before fully delegating authority is always detrimental.
Lemma 4. A combination of informational control and full delegation is payoff inferior to full delegation with the perfectly informed expert.
The intuition is that, unconditionally on both the quality of expert's information and the observed signal, full delegation results in the expert's decision, which has the constant bias b relative to the optimal principal's one. That is, the principal's payoff of delegated decision making does not depend on the quality of the expert's information. However, reducing the quality of information introduces the informational losses, which decrease the ex-ante payoff of the riskaverse principal.
By making a decision about controlling the expert's information and transferring decision rights completely, the principal has to use the more efficient instrument separately. A question about which instrument is better for each value of the bias is not difficult. If the players' interests are closely aligned, then informational control dominates optimal delegation, which is superior to unrestricted delegation. Moreover, if the preferences are far apart, then very biased expert's decisions in delegation cannot improve on the uninformed payoff. Therefore, full delegation can be more beneficial only if the bias is moderate. For instance, in the uniform-quadratic framework, full delegation dominates informational control if and only if b ∈ (1/4, 1/ √ 12 ).
Restricted delegation: the uniform-quadratic case
Given the finding above, controlling the expert's information before delegating power to her can be beneficial only if the principal is able to restrict the set of expert's decisions. In this case, controlling both information and the delegation set cannot perform worse than pure communication with the imperfectly informed expert, since the principal can specify an information structure and a set of actions as those in a communication equilibrium. This observation raises two questions. Can a combination of the instruments bring a strictly higher payoff than using instruments separately? If yes, then under what circumstances is it profitable to combine these tools?
The answer to the first question is not obvious because of the following argument. Along all lines of the analysis of informational control, we relied on the derived model-specific revelation principle, which states that the optimal payoff can be reached in a truthtelling equilibrium. However, in truthtelling equilibria, the expert reveals her information without any commitment on the part of the principal. Thus, it is not clear how commitment to actions can improve the principal's payoff in such a situation, where there seems to be no value of commitment.
The above intuition misses one issue. Even if it is true that commitment to actions cannot increase the principal's ex-ante payoff for a given incentive-compatible information structure, it can expand the set of such structures. Due to commitment, the principal has more possibilities for mapping the expert's information into particular actions. In the uniform-quadratic case with partitional information structures, if the principal can benefit from optimally delegating decisions to the perfectly informed expert, he can strictly benefit from using both tools simultaneously.
Theorem 4. If b < 1 2 , a combination of informational control and restricted delegation is strictly payoff superior to each separate instrument.
In a combined mechanism, the principal faces the trade-off between providing the expert with more precise information and making a decision sufficiently close to the principal's optimal one. The incentive-compatibility constraints of the better informed expert, i.e., that with a large number of possible types, enforce the principal to commit to the actions more beneficial to the expert rather than to the principal. Otherwise, any expert's type can distort information by mimicking another type. The principal may relax these constraints by specifying a discrete information structure and committing to the actions, which are between the optimal actions of the players. 21 As a result, even though the principal does not react to the expert's information optimally, a more flexible choice over actions allows him to specify a finer information structure than that without commitment. This results in the dominance of the combined mechanism compared to informational control. At the same time, each expert's type in the combined mechanism chooses the decision, which is closer to the principal's optimal one, compared to the mechanism with the perfectly informed expert. This leads to the better performance of the combined mechanism compared to delegation.
Concluding remarks
In the paper, we deliberately did not address the case, in which the person who determines the quality of the expert's information is the expert herself because the answer is straightforward. As demonstrated by Crawford and Sobel [7] for the leading uniform-quadratic example, the principal's expected utility is equal to the residual variance of the state in any communication equilibrium, since the principal's decisions are, on average, unbiased. As a result, the expert's ex-ante utility differs from that of the principal by a constant term. 22 This argument holds for any communication equilibrium unconditionally on the expert's information structure. Thus, if 21 The infinite type space creates the main problem for the efficiency-the easiness to manipulate information by claiming another type-unconditionally on the environment (cheap talks or mechanisms). Thus, even though the characterization of the optimal combined mechanism remains an open question, the constructed combined mechanism, which is payoff superior to both informational control and optimal delegation, involves a discrete information structure. 22 In particular,
there is a credible mechanism of the expert's commitment to the precision of information, then the expert's choice of the optimal information partition will be the same.
Another issue that we left behind, is a comparison of controlling information to other organizational forms such as delegating authority to a biased intermediary or delegation with a veto power, when the principal has a choice between only two decisions: recommended by the expert and some default option. These institutions are special cases of restricted delegation, which implies that they cannot perform more effectively than optimal delegation. Therefore, as soon as controlling information is preferred by the principal to optimal delegation, it is strictly preferred to all discussed forms of interaction.
A natural question to ask is whether informational control can work jointly with other incentive schemes, such as monetary transfers between the players? Since informational control damages the expert's primary information, it may potentially interfere with the other incentive instruments that extract more information from the expert. Nevertheless, monetary transfers have a feature that can be used as a complement to informational control. As shown by Krishna and Morgan [22] , the optimal contacts provide the expert incentives to convey the information that she is reluctant to reveal, that is, when the state is low. They are, however, less efficient for high values of the state. In contrast, the efficiency of informational control does not depend on the value of the state, since the informational losses are shared approximately equally across the state space. Thus, the principal should not restrict the expert's information for low states along with monetary incentives to reveal that information, and restrict information without additional incentives for high states. Applying this logic to a combination of informational control and transfers shows that it can work better than each tool used separately. 23 
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Appendix A
Denote by S(ω) = {s: ω s = ω} the set and by F (s|ω) = F (s | s ∈ S(ω)) the distribution of signals that generate a type ω. Also, let U S (a, b|ω) be the utility function of type ω:
where D ω = S(ω) D s dF (s|ω). Similarly, define U R (a|ω) = U S (a, 0|ω). 23 Consider the uniform-quadratic setup with b = 0.22. The principal determines the information structure as follows:
it reveals perfect information to the expert if the state is below z = 0.03, and partitions the rest of the state space [z, 1] into two uniform intervals. Also, given the expert's message that the state is θ z, the principal pays the transfer T (θ) = 153 2500 − 11 25 θ . Using the analysis by Krishna and Morgan [22] , this transfer scheme results in full separation for states below z. Also, the information structure is incentive-compatible for states above z. Moreover, the combination of the two instruments results in the principal's expected payoff −1/48.4, which is higher than that of −1/48 in the case of informational control and −1/18.4 in the case of communication with transfers only.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let a and a be two induced actions, where a > a. Consider types ω and ω , which induce corresponding actions, that is, U S (a, b|ω) U S (a , b|ω) and U S (a , b|ω ) U S (a, b|ω ). From (9), U S (a, b, ω) U S (a , b, ω) and U S (a , b, ω ) U S (a, b, ω ).
The single-crossing property of the expert's utility function Denote by σ a (ω) the probability of inducing an action a by the expert's type ω. Since A is finite, we can put
, where a i+1 > a i , ∀i. Let σ i (ω) be the probability of inducing an action a i by the type ω:
σ (m|s) dm dF (s|ω).
Now, we establish Lemma 5 and use it to prove the second part of the lemma. Condition (A) states that the expert of each type can mix between two adjacent actions only; (B) requires the expert of the highest type to purely induce the highest action; (C) is the singlecrossing property, which implies that if an expert of some type induces an action, then no expert of a higher type induces a lower action, and vice versa; (D) argues that the set of types that induce the same action is an interval on the type space; and (E) states that if some type induces two actions, then there exists a higher type that induces the higher action also.
Therefore, the expert's signaling strategy can be described by the pair of functions {j (ω), σ ω }, ω ∈ Ω, which means that a type ω induces a lower action a j (ω) with a probability σ ω > 0. With the complement probability, this type induces a j (ω)+1 .
Proof of Lemma 1 (cont.).
By contradiction, suppose that there exists an equilibrium, in which the finite number of induced actions #A strictly exceeds the number of types #Ω. For each action a, denoteω a the highest type that induces this action. Then, a > a impliesω a >ω a . Otherwise,ω a <ω a violates property (C) of Lemma 5. Also,ω a =ω a implies that the typeω a induces two actions. By property (E), there exists a type ω >ω a that induces a . This contradicts the fact thatω a is the highest type, inducing a . Thus, each action a ∈ A can be associated with a separate typeω a that contradicts the initial assumption. 2 Now, we identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an information structure to be incentive-compatible. A type ω i prefers an action a i to a i+1 > a i if and only if a i is closer to her optimal action ω i + b; that is, if
In a truthtelling equilibrium, a i = ω i and a i+1 = ω i+1 , so that (11) can be transformed into
Note that type ω i never induces an action a < a i , since a < a i = ω i < ω i + b means U S (a, b|ω i ) < U S (a i , b|ω i ). Thus, (12) guarantees that the information structure is incentivecompatible.
Proof of Lemma 2.
In any equilibrium with the information structure S, M, F (s|θ) and the action set A = {a i } N i=1 , denote W ⊂ Ω the set of types that induce two actions. That is, y i ∈ W implies y i = a i +a i+1 2 − b and σ y i ∈ (0, 1). Then, split the set Ω\W into a finite collection of subsets {W i } N i=1 of types that purely induce actions
. By property (C) of Lemma 5, these sets are strictly monotone in the sense that i > j implies ω > ω for all ω ∈ W i , ω ∈ W j . Also, if y i ∈ W induces actions a i and a i+1 , then
< a i+1 and
where the last inequality follows from the fact that a i+1 − y i > a i − y i and
Denote Ω i the set of types that induce an action a i ∈ A, that is, ω ∈ Ω i implies σ i (ω) > 0. By property (D) of Lemma 5, Ω i is an interval that includes W i . Also, if there exist y i−1 , y i ∈ W, then y i−1 and y i are the lower and the upper boundary points of Ω i , respectively. Thus, Ω i and Ω i+1 have at most one common point y i ∈ W. Then, the principal's best response can be described by
where P (ω i ) = W i dG(ω), and
Transform the expert's strategy
as follows. For any y i ∈ W, assign probability 1 to the lower action; that is, σ o
, the principal's ex-ante payoff is
where the first inequality follows from the fact that
, and the second inequality follows from (14) by summing across y i ∈ W.
Modify the information structure by collapsing each W o i into a single type 24 24 For i = N , put P (y N ) = 0.
We show now that each type ω o i , i = 1, . . . , N cannot beneficially deviate from inducing a o i . First, note that for any ω i and a pair (y i−1 , y i ), y i−1 < ω i < y i . Since y i ∈ W induces a i and a i+1 , then by property (C) of Lemma 5, ω > y i for ω ∈ W j , j i + 1. Hence, 
which implies that (12) holds for all
Proof of Corollary 1. First, if the mass of types in W is positive, then (14) implies that the second inequality in (17) is strict, which completes the first part of the proof. Second, suppose that there exists an interval of types W with a positive density g(ω) that induces two actions, a k and a k+1 . That is, there is a type ω s ∈ int W , such that all types in W below ω s purely induce an action a k , and all types in W above ω s purely induce a k+1 . Transform the equilibrium strategies, using the same technique as in Lemma 2. That is, for all types y ∈ W, attribute 1 to the probability of inducing the lower action. Then, collapse each set W o i that purely induce an action a i , into a single type ω o i . The resulting equilibrium is truthtelling and provides the payoff U o R to the principal that is (weakly) superior to that in the initial equilibrium. Denote by {a o i } N i=1 the action set in this equilibrium. Now, modify the initial information structure as follows. As previously, put σ y i = 1 for all y i ∈ W. In addition, consider a type ω δ = ω s + δ, where δ ↓ 0, and put
Thus, for δ > 0, we reallocate a positive mass of types from W o k+1 to W o k . We prove now that the resulting information structure is incentive-compatible and the ex-ante payoff
be the principal's best response to the truthtelling strategy σ i (ω δ i ) = 1, ∀i:
, and thus, a δ i = a o i for all i = k, k + 1. The principal's ex-ante payoff is 
Also, we need to show that the truthtelling strategy is incentive-compatible, or
By construction,
and
, where P (ω δ ) = (20) can be represented by Taylor's formula around θ k as a k ( θ k (12) becomes (21) into
which is satisfied for b ↓ 0, because μ(θ) is bounded. The principal's ex-ante payoff in the truthtelling equilibrium is
Because
where O(x) has an order x.
Kovàc and Mylovanov [21] show that for small b, the optimal delegation set is an interval 
Since c b ∈ (2, 3) and ε b → 0 as b ↓ 0, it follows that
Lemma 6. In the uniform-quadratic case, if the uniform partition of size N is incentivecompatible, then it is payoff superior to all partitions of the same size.
Proof. The principal's ex-ante payoff in the truthtelling equilibrium is
where φ(x) = − Proof. We prove the lemma using Karamata's inequality. 26 Let sequences {x k } N k=1 and {y k } N k=1
be non-increasing, that is, x 1 x 2 · · · x N and y 1 y 2 · · · y N . If all the following conditions are satisfied:
, and a function φ(x) is continuous and concave, then Consider the partition {y k } N k=0 , for which the IC constraints are binding, hence, y k = 2kb for even k, and y k = 1 − 2b(N − k) for odd k. We need to show that if
, which satisfies (7). For the sequence {y k } N k=0 , we have
, we obtain a non-increasing sequence
2 , . . . , N}. Note that S 1 contains one element less than S 2 , since N is odd. Also, (7) 
Now, consider a sequence {θ k } N k=0 , which satisfies (7). We need to show that a non-increasing 
Also, (7) implies that for any k
2 , . . . , N − 1, there exists q(k) ∈ S 1 such that X q(k) + X k 4b, which we define as follows.
Clearly,
. In addition,
Applying this argument for all k ∈S 2 , we complete the proof as By Lemmas 6 and 7, it is payoff superior to all partitions of the same and smaller sizes.
Consider two cases: . In the first case, 2bc 1 means that the uniform partition of size c is incentive-compatible. Thus, it is optimal in the class on partitions of size c and brings the ex-ante payoff U R = − 1 12c 2 . In the second case, Lemma 8 implies that among all partitions of size c = N(b), the superior partition is that with the binding IC constraints (7) . It provides the ex-ante payoff
Then, (24) gives and S 1 (θ ) F (θ) . The values of ω 1 and ω 2 are determined by
Then,
The principal's ex-ante payoff in the truthtelling equilibrium is
Consider the two-element partition {0, θ 1 , 1} that generates
where the inequality holds, because S o
That is, Ω o is incentivecompatible and provides the ex-ante payoff
and φ(x) = x 2 is convex, by weighted Karamata's inequality,
Proof of Theorem 3. First, Holmström [18] proves that the optimal delegation set is the interval 
which provides the ex-ante payoff , there is no information structure that sustains informative communication. First, there is no incentive-compatible information structure with more than two types. By contradiction, if ω 1 < ω 2 < ω 3 ∈ Ω ⊂ [0, 1], then (12) results in ω 3 − ω 1 = ω 3 − ω 2 + ω 2 − ω 1 4b > 1. In addition, (7) means that there is no incentive-compatible partition. By Claim 1, there is no two-type incentive-compatible information structure, so that informational control provides the uninformed ex-ante payoff − Given the type space Ω and the delegation set A, the expert of type ω k = θ k−1 +θ k 2 chooses a S (ω k ) ∈ A according to (11) . Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to the class of combined mechanisms, in which each expert's type induces a separate action. To demonstrate this, suppose that a type ω ∈ W mixes between actions a and a > a , that is, U S (a , b|ω) = U S (a , b|ω), we assign 1 to the probability of inducing the lower action. Then, by (13) , it follows that U S (a , b|ω) − U S (a , b|ω) > 0. Reapplying this argument to all mixing types, we obtain an equilibrium, which is payoff superior to the initial one. Also, if the number of types strictly exceeds that of actions, then collapsing the types, which induce identical actions, results in the payoff equivalent equilibrium.
Property (C) of Lemma 5 guarantees that induced actions are monotone in types, that is, the delegation set A ={a k } N k=1 = {a S (ω k )} N k=1 is a strictly increasing sequence. Thus, the expert of a type ω k prefers an action a k to any other action if and only if 
Conversely, a pair of sequences { k , ξ k } N k=1 , which satisfies the properties above, determines the information structure {θ k } N k=0 and the delegation set {a k } N k=1 of the combined mechanism as θ k = θ k−1 + k + ξ k , a k = θ k − ξ k , k = 1, . . . , N, where θ 0 = 0. Then, we can rewrite (29) as k + k+1 2b, and (33)
The principal's ex-ante payoff is Proof of Theorem 4. By Theorem 3, it is sufficient to show that there exists a combined mechanism, which provide the superior payoff to the principal than that in the optimal delegation if b ∈ ( 
